Naval War College Review
Volume 59
Number 1 Winter

Article 4

2006

SSGN
Charles D. Sykora

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Sykora, Charles D. (2006) "SSGN," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Sykora: SSGN

SSGN
A Transformation Limited by Legacy Command and Control
Captain Charles D. Sykora, U.S. Navy

A pivotal tenet of the new defense strategy is the ability to respond
quickly, and thus set the initial conditions for either deterrence or the
swift defeat of an aggressor. . . . Today we increasingly rely on forces
that are capable of both symmetric and asymmetric responses to current
and potential threats. . . . Such swift, lethal campaigns . . . clearly place
a premium on having the right forces in the right place at the right
time. . . . We must also be able to act preemptively to prevent terrorists
from doing harm to our people and our country and to prevent our
enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons
of mass destruction.
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, 2003

A

s budget challenges put increasing pressure on the operational forces, the
ability to deter both potential adversary nations and terrorists will require
the warfighting platforms of the United States to be ready to perform diverse
missions in parallel. Transformation of operational and tactical precepts will be
required to support these increasing demands. The nuclear-powered
guided-missile (actually, cruise-missile) submarine, or SSGN, is just such a
transformational asset. Indeed, the converted
Captain Sykora, a submariner, is currently the ComOhio-class cruise-missile-carrying submarine is in
mander Naval Submarine Forces Shipyard Representative at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, having graduated
many ways a “poster child” for transformation, particfrom the Naval War College with highest distinction in
ularly in its employment of existing and new technolMarch 2005. He has commanded USS Dallas (SSN
ogies in innovative ways to bring new combat power
700) and served on two other fast attack submarines
and three Trident ballistic missile boats. He has been a
to bear. However, taking full advantage of this orderlegislative fellow for Senator John Warner, completed
of-magnitude increase in power available from a single
an assignment at J-38 (Nuclear Operations) on the
platform will require new command and control
Joint Staff, and served as a junior member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board of Commander,
methods, as an imaginary but realistic vignette
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
will illustrate. That said, however, even rather miNaval War College Review, Winter 2006, Vol. 59, No. 1
nor modifications to existing command and control
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architecture—a negotiated mission-prioritization matrix defining multiple simultaneous operational control relationships—would produce a revolutionary
advance over existing methods.
SSGN: TRANSFORMATION’S POSTER CHILD
Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military
competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts,
capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain
our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in
the world.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE, 2003

The SSGN is the first weapons platform to represent in itself a truly
transformational, order-of-magnitude advance. Why? After all, the submarine is
not the only asset capable of multiple missions. In fact, the services today build
every platform with an eye toward mission versatility. Most naval assets (unlike
those of other services that must routinely return to an operating base for rearming or retraining for new missions) deploy with the equipment and training
to fulfill multiple roles. So what makes the SSGN unique in this way?
The first aspect of the SSGN’s order-of-magnitude transformational ability
stems from its “presence ratio,” the fraction of time it will operate forward deployed and fulfilling requirements of operational commanders. Its presence ratio is the best in the business: the four converted Ohio-class submarines leverage
the logistics infrastructure of the Trident ships to achieve a forward presence of
1
2.65 with only four boats. That is, an average of 2.65 of these four submarines
will be on the job at any given moment, a rate no other platform can match for
prolonged periods. The SSGN achieves this astonishing ratio by capitalizing
upon an earlier transformational change, one made decades ago at the onset of
the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) program. It will use a modification of
the SSBN blue-crew/gold-crew patrol cycle—the progenitor of today’s Sea Swap
2
(crew rotation to extend the forward presence of deployed ships).
The SSGN’s enormous potential is what drove the conversion of excess Trident submarines into cruise-missile arsenal ships, despite opposition from no3
table defense analysts. The president himself advocated the idea: “President
George W. Bush’s statements on transformation of the U.S. military rarely are
associated with specific programs, with two exceptions—the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle and the conversion of Ohio (SSBN 726)–class ballistic
4
missile submarines to conventionally armed guided-missile submarines.”
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Similarly, the Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress for 2003 highlights only the SSGN and two other platforms (the CVN-21
aircraft carrier and UCAV-45, an unmanned combat aerial vehicle) as examples
of progress toward the transformative operational goals specified in the 2001
5
Quadrennial Defense Review. Even before the internal report, the National Defense Panel, congressionally chartered to provide a second opinion on the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review, specifically advocated only two new programs in
its report, and one of them was the SSGN (the other was CVX, an advanced
6
aircraft-carrier design). The panel also reaffirmed the urgency of the need to
pursue transformation, which had been introduced in the 1997 Defense Reform
Initiative and was then a topic of academic debate in connection with the con7
cept of a “revolution in military affairs.” Since then, many decision makers have
firmly associated the SSGN with transformation. Now that the administration’s
recent departure from the two-major-theater-war force structure has freed up
resources to finance transformation, the Defense Department, the Navy, and
especially submariners can ill afford for the cruise-missile submarine to be
anything but a complete success when it reaches initial operational capability
8
in 2007.
In what sense, though, is the SSGN transformative? The idea of “transformation,” a frequent buzzword in today’s defense circles, is all too likely to be misunderstood. One common misunderstanding is that “legacy systems . . . are suspect
9
if not anathema.” The extract from Transformation Planning Guidance above is a
useful operative definition, but since it was President Bush who ignited the fires of
transformation in the Defense Department by making it a major and early goal,
his own words shortly after taking office are relevant: “We’re witnessing a revolution in the technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Advantage increasingly comes from information. . . . Safety
is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided
10
weapons. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”
The ultimate goal of transformation is to make technological leaps in order to
revolutionize warfare. Submarines have made such leaps on several occasions,
particularly during World War II, as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Stephen A. Cambone explains:
After all, submarine warfare has been about transformation for over 100 years—its
birth was difficult as it struggled against the naval establishment’s view of warfare,
and it wrestled with the constraints of physics and the limits of technology. . . . The
submarine assault on the Imperial Japanese Navy and the blockade of Japan, came at
the cost of 52 submarines and more than 3,500 valiant men. But it dealt a crippling
blow to Imperial ambition.11
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In the postwar years the submarine force continued its reputation for
change; ultimately nuclear power and the ballistic missile submarine were vital
12
in winning the Cold War. The submarine has always been about transformation; some have argued that the only reason the U.S. military today is able to focus almost exclusively on projecting power ashore is that “nuclear submarines,
space based and sea based ocean sensors, the communications links to couple
them . . . give the United States an asymmetric advantage (another aspect of
Transformation) that assures that the use of the high seas by others depends
13
upon American forbearance.”
We are speaking here of the kind of transformation—marked by a great technological leap, the “big jump”—specifically envisioned by the Defense Depart14
ment’s official transformation strategy. But the cruise-missile submarine is not
leap-ahead technology, and it “won’t necessarily have a lot of new capabilities,
15
other than being able to deliver more missions from a stealthy platform.” Further, most of the real value the SSGN modification will bring to the combat
equation—compared, say, to the installation of the vertical launch system in Los
Angeles–class submarines—is a direct result of size. Whereas the improved Los
Angeles can carry up to forty Tomahawk land-attack missiles (if it has no other
torpedo-tube-launched weapons), the SSGN in maximum-strike configuration
will have 154. Alternatively, the SSGN, deploying with slightly fewer (126) missiles, will be large enough to carry two Naval Special Warfare delivery mechanisms—dry-deck shelters or Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems, or one of each—
together with sixty-six men and equipment (up to 102 men for short dura16
tions). Current fast attack submarines (SSNs) carry only one of these systems
and lack facilities to keep large numbers of SEALs on board for long periods.
If, however, the submarine is not revolutionary from a technological perspective, it is thoroughly transformational in two other specific ways associated with
17
warfighting platforms, both involving “exploratory medium jumps.” The first
involves developing future warfighting capability. The Transformation Planning
Guidance calls this “concept development and experimentation” and identifies it
18
as one of four pillars of transformation. Here the SSGN excels; in fact, one of
the missions envisioned for the conversion is “future payload experimentation,”
an important aspect of the Navy’s Sea Trial program, itself a key component of
19
the Sea Power 21 vision. Such payloads, deployed from a vertical missile tube,
lockout chamber, torpedo tube, or dry-deck shelter, will be tested on each patrol
as operations permit.
The second variety of “medium jump” is the application of new doctrine and
of new tactics, techniques, and procedures to existing or even antiquated technology. The horse-mounted special operations personnel in Afghanistan
who called in precision attacks from the venerable B-52 bomber to achieve
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spectacular successes against al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban were an example. Of
this kind of change Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, formerly deputy secretary of defense, has
said, “Transformation can mean using old things in new ways—a natural result
of creative innovation.” Here too the SSGN can excel by virtue of its increased
volume, almost quadrupling the weapon inventory of earlier types and permitting manning at levels that should allow it to carry out operations with a simultaneity and at a rate that will maximize “shock and awe.”
One has to look no farther than Joint Vision 2020 to understand this second
medium jump—transformational ideas can be “innovative and form a vision
for integrating doctrine, tactics, training, supporting activities, and technology
20
into new operational capabilities.” That Joint Staff roadmap for the future also
declares that “faster operations tempos, increased choices among weapons and
effects, and greater weapons ranges will require continuous, simultaneous plan21
ning and execution at all levels.”
The Defense Department and the U.S. Navy have done a great deal of groundwork in preparation for the SSGN’s advent, producing a draft Standard Opera22
tions and Regulations Manual as well as an SSGN Concept of Operations.
Commander, Naval Submarine Forces (ComNavSubFor) has formed four work23
ing groups to address operational, manning, and logistics issues. Finally,
ComNavSubFor has issued a contract to study SSGN command and control is24
sues. Under the rubric of the Navy’s Concept Development and Evaluation
program, ComNavSubFor has submitted a proposal for an SSGN command and
control (C2) war game, with as one of its objectives the determination of the
25
number and types of taskings an SSGN crew could perform simultaneously.
What could possibly be missing? The answer lies within ComNavSubFor’s
war-game proposal:
With such a wide variety of capabilities—and the more fluid command structures envisioned in a progressively more joint military—it is almost inevitable that multiple
command structures (e.g. Strategic Command [StratCom], Theater Strike Commander, Joint Forces Commander) will at some points simultaneously require mission
support from the same SSGN. . . . Managing these command and control relationships
is critical to optimizing the utility of the SSGN’s capabilities and resources.26

If staffs solve this C2 dilemma, the cruise-missile submarine will indeed be a
forerunner of a new breed of transformational platforms. The SSGN will be a
force multiplier unto itself—if those in uniform, particularly Navy uniforms,
push ahead the doctrinal, tactical, and procedural changes required.
With this challenge in mind, consider the following hypothetical situation, in
which we can see the SSGN as a “hypertactical” asset, performing a variety of
missions simultaneously on behalf of multiple operational masters.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 1, Art. 4
46

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

AN “INTERESTING WATCH” IN 2008
It is Thanksgiving in the Strait of Hormuz, and for
two hours Lieutenant Barik has been Operations
Watch Officer (OWO) in the Battle Management
27
Center (BatCen) aboard USS Florida (SSGN 728).
The ship is at communications depth on a moonless
night. Barik is reviewing the new “launch baskets”
for the updated standing U.S. Central Command
(USCentCom) strike package he’d received over the
Global Broadcasting System at the start of his watch. He listens on an open mike
to the internal communications circuit from the submarine’s nearby control
stand, where the officer of the deck (OOD) monitors through the periscope
merchant traffic in the strait.
Barik would soon hear the signal that means the SEALs are safe. This signal, a
brief burst of noise designed to mimic natural biological sounds, would indicate
that the SEALs are approaching Florida in order to couple their ASDS minisub,
the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, to the hatch of the number-one missile
tube of the giant submarine. Naturally, Barik is not the only one waiting for the
signal. War is building in Korea, and the Joint Special Operations Component
Commander in the Mediterranean is dual-hatting for the USCentCom Standing
Joint Force Headquarters in Qatar; that staff is just as interested as he in knowing
the SEALs are safe.
The submarine has been in a UHF emissions-control (EMCON) posture—
restricted from ultra-high-frequency transmissions—since the special warfare
operations began three days before; until it is lifted, the ship can use only extremely high-frequency (EHF) circuits for outgoing message traffic. Lieutenant
Barik has come to appreciate the expansion of the military’s satellite bandwidth
driven by ForceNet, the Navy’s communications piece of network-centric
warfare.
The transmission restrictions are a necessary evil, of course. The current mission matrix—the table that tells Florida, the nation’s first hypertactical asset,
which of its missions takes priority, should they conflict—has indicated that
special-warfare operations are job one. That means that the crew cannot permit
anyone or anything to detect the submarine, since detection would jeopardize
the SEALs’ mission, perhaps even their lives. After all, the special operations
forces are on a highly classified task. Until this morning, Barik knew only that it
involved a country adjoining the strait. At that point, the Office of Naval Intelligence representative within the embarked Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Cell revealed that the objective is to determine the real-time
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whereabouts of Sheik Abdul Omar al-Tarabulus, operational mastermind of
al-Qa‘ida since the demise of Osama Bin Laden.
Barik envies the OOD, Lieutenant Commander Roark. The lucky Roark, the
ship’s engineer officer, is acoustically tracking the progress of the merchant vessel Lady Juleema, which the watch team identified by classified techniques from
the full spectrum of its electronic and acoustic emissions. The ship is a designated terrorist “Tier Alfa” vessel—meaning that the CentCom Joint Intelligence
Center has confirmed that it had smuggled terrorist personnel or equipment.
Weather during the last week and other demands on “overhead” reconnaissance
left the Lady Juleema unlocated for almost five days, when satellite imagery last
confirmed the ship in Chabahar, an Iranian port outside the strait on the Gulf of
Oman.
The fact that the submarine found the vessel under way when all other search
assets failed would be worthy of a mention in the ship’s patrol report and might
even earn the boat an “attaboy” on the next High Interest Vessel Locator message. Ever since the North Korean incursion began the previous month, the Gulf
has been a ghost town, as far as American naval forces go; the USS Ronald Reagan
(CVN 76) carrier strike group departed three weeks ago, taking with it one of
Florida’s operational masters. The submarine now works for only two bosses,
besides USCentCom: a joint operations command center (JOCC) under Special
Operations Command, for special-warfare operations, and U.S. Strategic Command (USStratCom) for cruise-missile attacks under the Global Strike operational doctrine. For the time being, in fact, Barik and his shipmates constitute
the only American naval presence in the Gulf—and they hope that no one but
selected staff members at their various commanders’ headquarters know that. If
there seemed to be no U.S. forces around to notice, the terrorists might be
tempted to act recklessly.
So Lieutenant Commander Roark, taking his turn “dancing with the oneeyed lady,” would probably get the first periscope sighting of Lady Juleema.
Sure, Barik would like to be the one to see the vessel first, but that job is behind
him; he now enjoys a new sense of excitement as the OWO, a certified tactical
Tomahawk targeteer, qualified to convert targeting information into a strike
mission right on board. He brings to the task the experience he gained ashore
during his rotation crew’s off-time as a watch officer in the USCentCom operations center.
An excited cry interrupts his thoughts: “Got her!” comes the OOD’s shout
over the open mike from the conn into BatCen. Selecting the periscope infrared
video on his own monitor, Barik studies the silhouetted vessel’s characteristic
superstructure—all of it that is visible over the horizon. Mast-kingpost-funnel,
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with the kingpost of the “teepee” variety . . . probably the Lady, but they’ll know
for sure soon enough.
Barik starts at a sudden shrill tweeting from the acoustic-intercept receiver.
The alarm might indicate the intercept of any of a variety of signals, but he hopes
it is the one he has been waiting for. Barik hears on his speaker when the executive officer (XO) pushes the rubber-jacketed button on his phone circuit to the
captain; there is no sound on the planet more obnoxious than the buzzer on U.S.
submarines for this most private of lines between the periscope stand, radio, the
CO, and the wardroom, and it will jar the skipper awake. “Captain—” the XO begins, only to be interrupted by the planesman shouting, “Captain’s on the conn!”
Captain Rievers’s voice comes over the open mike, “XO, you know I can’t
sleep when the SEALs are out . . . not that I don’t trust you, of course. I heard it on
the open mike. Good job, Mr. Roark. Now show me some submarining!”
Barik smiles. Roark will have his work cut out for him now. The SEALs are on
the way back, but the merchant is, as luck would have it, bearing directly down
on Florida. The constraints of territorial waters, the steady course the submarine
will have to steer to recover the ASDS, and the merchant’s heading approaching the Arabian Gulf from
the Gulf of Oman, add up to quite a challenge. At
any other time, the watch team would relish the
chance to record up close the suspect ship’s electromagnetic, acoustic, and visual characteristics, giving
the onboard ONI cell an opportunity to look for
changes. Just last month this very merchant vessel
was renamed and repainted in an effort to mask its
illicit activities; Barik took pride in the fact that it
was his first submarine, Toledo, that videoed the vessel’s transformation and departure from a Southeast Asian dock. But now they are in for some fun.
Barik picks up the phone and punches Radio. “Petty Officer Berke, line up to
transmit EHF back to the JOCC. Prepare the ‘SEALs recovered, all’s well’ message I sent you earlier. When we get into secure acoustic communications range
of the ASDS and receive the ‘all’s well’ pro-word, advise the Officer of the Deck
you are ready to send the message.”
“Aye, sir,” the young electronics technician replies.
The OWO sets his monitor to display the Global Information Grid and studies the Tomahawk launch baskets highlighted in red in the CentCom standing
strike package. Barik needs to get these missile missions ready for the captain to
review before the end of his watch; he has two more to prepare. The requirements to keep the strike package up to date are very strict; after all, you never
know when StratCom will, as the Florida officers like to say, “reach out and
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touch you,” and order a strike package. As an SSGN in CentCom, Florida is
the most timely strike asset available, especially when in “cocked” readiness
posture—continuously receiving both digital and voice data. As Barik clicks the
send button to transmit the missions to the captain for approval, he picks up the
phone and punches up the conn: “Officer of the Deck, Operations Watch Officer. Request you notify the skipper that the strike missions are ready for his
review.”
“Very well, Ops. You know, there is only one way this watch could get more interesting—,” Roark was saying, when sure enough, an excited voice from the ISR
cell in the BatCen behind him claims his attention: “Sir! Ops! We have an intercept! Looks like it’s from the Lady! A cell phone call, sir.”
“Very well,” Barik replies, and addresses the radioman once again. “I know
this is high priority, but it doesn’t warrant breaking UHF EMCON. Petty Officer
Berke, get it over EHF to our NSA reach-back as soon as the Officer of the Deck
can manage.” The “reach-back” cell at the National Security Agency complex in
Maryland is a direct, full-time player in this operation. “Do we still have an EHF
data uplink?”
“Yes. I’ll coordinate with ISR to get the recording uplinked if you get me the
antenna,” the radioman replies.
The officer of the deck cuts in, “Ops, I caught all that. We’re lucky right now,
and I don’t have any merchants too close other than the Lady. I can give you the
HDR mast if you can get your message transmitted inside fifteen minutes.” The
high-data-rate antenna will get the report off in the least possible time. “The
Lady will be too close after that to have an extra mast up and risk the radar
exposure.”
“Understand. By the way, I think you just jinxed yourself—the watch just got
more interesting.”
The OWO spends the next few minutes coordinating the activities of ISR and
radio. The intercept recording is so long that they barely make the OOD’s transmission deadline. Barik takes advantage of the opportunity to send the SEALs’
“all’s well” message to USCentCom.
Once the HDR mast is housed again, Barik returns his attention to the tactical
display, noting that the OOD has skillfully moved the sub away from the merchant’s track and is steering the recovery course for the ASDS. In fact, as the sonar display shows, the tiny, battery-powered sub is already angling in from
astern, only two hundred yards away.
The staccato chirp of a Priority Tasking Alert sounds over the open mike.
There are only two reasons for that alarm—real or exercise Global Strike tasking.
Barik turns to his BYG-1 remote console and scans the alert area for the cause of
the alarm. There it is, “a VLF Priority Task Alert.” The cryptic message means
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that they received by very-low-frequency radio a message with urgent strike
tasking from StratCom.
Once again, Captain Rievers was listening alertly to the open mike. Before
Barik can inform the OOD, the captain’s voice comes over the circuit: “Officer of
the Deck, station the missile strike party. Send a brief message to StratCom to
tell them we’ll be ready to execute strike tasking in two hours. Get those SEALs
on board, stand down the ISR cell, and make best speed to the international waters of the Gulf of Oman. Once there, re-man the ISR cell, secure from UHF
EMCON, and prepare for Global Strike tasking. Call me when you’re ready for
periscope depth again. I’m going to BatCen to approve the missions.”
As the CO enters the Battle Management Center, Barik asks, “Captain, the action’s in the Yellow Sea. Why would we get tasking from StratCom rather than
CentCom?”
Captain Rievers shrugs. “I don’t know, Mr. Barik. My guess is the SEALs’ mission paid off and the source of the tasking is too time-sensitive to go through
CentCom. Of course,” the skipper smiles, “it could be just an exercise . . . ”
As the CO bends over the BYG-1 console and calls up the strike missions, the
phone circuit howls again. Sighing, the OWO grabs the handset. “BatCen, Ops.”
The junior radioman on the other end can’t quite keep the excitement out of
his voice. “Ops, we’re getting Flash-precedence traffic on VLF. I patched it to
your monitor.”
“What now?” Barik laments to himself, striding over to the computer and
reading the message at the low data rate to which the very-low-frequency broadcast is limited. He whistles.
“Are you keeping secrets, Mr. Barik?” the skipper asks.
“Sir, it’s from Cent. It says, ‘CentCom notified of Global Strike tasking. NSA
confirms BOUNCED CHECK on Lady Juleema. As soon as strike operations are
complete, you are directed to destroy the Lady Juleema. ROE’”—the rules of engagement that would govern the engagement—“‘and formal tasking to follow.
Sensitive background information sent Eyes-Only.’”
Barik turns away from the monitor, winces, and
asks, “Captain, ‘BOUNCED CHECK,’ doesn’t that
mean the ship is carrying WMD? It must have been
the cell phone intercept.”
In his characteristic manner, Captain Rievers
only purses his lips and nods as he grabs a handset
and calls the OOD: “Officer of the Deck, turn
around and head for the Arabian Gulf. We’ll execute
the strike from there, then man the torpedo attack
party and kill the Juleema.”
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COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS
The development of effective joint command and control for the future
requires rigorous and wide-ranging experimentation, focused especially
on organizational innovation and doctrinal change.
JOINT VISION 2020

Realistic? Certainly. Melodramatic? Perhaps. Achievable? Unfortunately, not—
today. Under existing command and control doctrine, the Florida could not
work for multiple operational masters in such a way. Current doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures would not meet the postulated situation. Consider
the array of command and control problems evident in this scene-setting scenario. It may be unlikely that circumstances would so coincide as to require
simultaneous tactical action, but it would be unwise to keep in place a C2 architecture incapable of handling such an eventuality. Furthermore, U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSoCom) advocates SEAL operations from submarines to develop data ashore, data that the submarine would then use to strike
targets. Given this concept, a need to support SEALs while executing a strike is
likely to arise sometime during the Global War on Terror. In fact, the GIANT
SHADOW exercise of January 2003 involved a complex variant of this mission—
two instrumented land-attack Tomahawks fired to demonstrate not just the targeting scenario but also the Multiple All-Up-Round Canister that would hold
28
the missiles inside one Trident tube.
In the scenario above, the Florida receives tasking from several commanders.
USSoCom directs the Naval Special Warfare operation in progress through a
joint operations command center and, certainly, with a joint task force between
the SSGN and the JOCC. In the past, Special Operations Forces missions were always conducted under the regional combatant commander,* with USSoCom as
a supporting commander.29 A change in 2002 to the Unified Command Plan,
however, empowered USSoCom to act as a “supported commander”—that is,
30
with the regional commander supporting him. Presumably, this arrangement
would be made in accordance with the provision of Unified Actions Armed Forces
that when one combatant commander must conduct operations in one or more
(different) regional combatant commanders’ area of responsibility, a joint task force
31
is to be formed, approved by the president, and assigned a joint operations area.
Regardless of the command setup for the NSW mission, no strike tasking is
likely to be conducted at the direction of Special Operations Command. In the
* Functional combatant commanders (USSoCom, USStratCom, and the U.S. Transportation Command) perform specialized tasks worldwide. The geographic combatant commanders (U.S. Central, European, Pacific, Northern, and Southern Commands) pursue broad warfighting
responsibilities within defined regions.
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scenario, U.S. Strategic Command, in its Global Strike role, directs the missile
launch. Some might argue that the strike should have been the prerogative of Central Command. The Global Strike concept of operations is still under development, but there seem to be two cases in which USStratCom operational control
would be appropriate for an SSGN, both of them in the absence of declared hostilities in the target country. (Of course, presidential approval of the strike would be
required.) The first case would be a target of a strategic nature—the destruction of
which, for example, the U.S. political leadership believes would deter a conflict. A
second case would arise for a highly time-sensitive target, such as a terrorist leadership site or a facility or launcher for weapons of mass destruction. Since
USStratCom’s Cruise Missile Support Activity might have to develop the target
parameters, timeliness (and hence the likelihood of success) could be improved if
that command also orders the missile attack. Florida’s strike fits both criteria.
Whatever the reason that USStratCom exercises operational control of a strike,
the attack could be conducted using C2 analogous to that of NSW. Florida, for instance, would have a task-unit designation as a member of the joint forces assigned to Commander, Task Force–Global Strike, with a joint operations area
defined either by the terrain of the current Global Strike target set (and possibly
changing with target package updates) or by relatively fixed boundaries.
With the two unconventional missions covered, one might think the remaining
tasks are straightforward. One of these, however—intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance—is not as simple as it seems, because the information obtained is of
interest to two masters. Clearly, USCentCom’s intelligence directorate will receive
the submarine’s ISR output. USSoCom will also be a “customer,” however; one of
Florida’s main tasks while the SEALs were away would have been “indications and
warning,” scouring tactical frequencies for signs of enemy discovery of the mission.
This might be an unusual pairing of consumers of the ship’s intelligence, but procedures already exist to disseminate the data to concerned parties for ISR missions;
after all, submarines have been performing these tasks for decades.
The last mission area involving tactical action represented in the scenario is
antisurface warfare. It uses the most conventional command and control mechanism—the regional combatant commander exercises operational control
through the theater joint forces maritime component commander, and any defined subordinates, to order the submarine to attack the Lady Juleema. There are,
of course, additional submarine mission areas, such as mine warfare, that the
vignette does not stress, but they would all fall under conventional C2 with the
regional combatant commander.
One significant SSGN operating profile is not brought out by the scenario.
The SSGN Concept of Operations envisions several situations where the
cruise-missile boat might operate with SSNs in consort, carrying in the Battle
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Management Center an officer in tactical command “dual-hatted” as a joint task
force commander. If such a situation developed rapidly, however, it might be impractical for the SSGN to board such a staff. The cruise-missile submarine’s
commander would become the officer in tactical command of the task group or
32
force—perhaps as a submerged battle group, as has been suggested. Existing
doctrine should be sufficient to support the concept, although it may be prudent
33
to consider additional tactics and procedures.
Once the C2 methods that the functional combatant commanders would use
to conduct operations in a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility have been promulgated, tested, and understood, none of the individual
actions involved in the various mission areas are challenging in themselves. Fast
attack submarines have been executing these missions for many years. However, the
methods they now use fail to address the major command and control problem.
Currently, there is no doctrine, tactics, or procedure to support multiple combatant
commanders exercising simultaneous operational control over the same unit. In
fact, many might consider multiple “OpCon” contrary to joint doctrine.
But is it? Does joint doctrine prohibit more than one commander’s exercising
operational (or tactical) control over a task unit? Surprisingly, there are no explicit
prohibitions in the relevant joint doctrine publications against multiple command and control chains.34 In fact, when units deploy, they always have two differ35
ent chains of command, operational and administrative. However, the Joint
Staff ’s United Action Armed Forces (UNAAF, or Joint Publication 0-2), by drawing
attention to these two parallel chains of command—operational and “other” (administrative)—implies that there is only one operational chain of command, an
idea most strongly associated with unity of command. UNAAF explains, “Unity of
command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite
36
authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.” With
the exception of strike, individual mission areas can satisfy that criterion, since
only one commander exercises responsibility for each. Even in strike warfare, if
one factors in the type of strike—that is, strategic or time-sensitive, as opposed to
operational, “fires” (that is, strikes considered in terms of weapon effects)—unity
37
of command can still be achieved. Given that unity of command can be achieved
in each mission area, then, is there a way to solve the multiple OpCon problem?
CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL SHORTFALLS
As the nature of military operations evolves, there is a need to evaluate
continually the nature of command and control organizations, mechanisms, systems, and tools. There are two major issues to address in this
evaluation—command structures and processes.
JOINT VISION 2020
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Before answering the question, it may be useful to review why existing submarine arrangements will not meet the command and control conundrum. First,
submariners may point out that exercising operational control in another regional commander’s area of responsibility is nothing new. After all, throughout
the history of the nuclear submarine, deployed boats have shifted to the operational control of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform sensitive,
presidentially directed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.
Furthermore, the UNAAF already provides a mechanism to deal with the situation of one commander directing operations in another’s area of responsibility,
as detailed above. Still, this does little to solve the problem at hand.
Submariners might also insist that multiple command arrangements are not
unprecedented for fast attack submarines. The Submarine Operating Authority
who assigns waterspace (that is, volumes of ocean bounded in three dimensions
so as to avoid mutual interference) to submarines is almost never the commander
exercising tactical control, if a boat is attached to a carrier or expeditionary strike
group. This is certainly a valid argument, and it may well turn out that
submariners will experience no difficulty in working for multiple commanders.
If, then, submariners can already come to terms with the idea of working for
numerous masters, what is there about current SSN command and control that
will not work for the SSGN? After all, the missions are the same. But in fact the
operational constructs are different in one important mission, Global Strike. In
planning strategic or highly time-sensitive operational fires, U.S. Strategic Command must be able to establish with certainty when the attack will take place.
Furthermore, it may have to vary the time frame, for reasons having to do with
targets under consideration as well as the world political climate. The problem is
that SSNs go as long as twenty-four hours (twelve is more typical) between periods near enough to the surface to communicate by radio, especially when
transiting at high speed and great depth. In the worst case, it could be forty-eight
hours before a submarine crew could discover and execute tasking. The tactical
commander can shorten this communications “window,” but the procedures for
38
doing so are burdensome and generally not intuitive to nonsubmariners. Furthermore, making the submarine available for communications too frequently
may make it difficult or impossible for it to pursue other missions.
Fortunately, there are “bellringer” procedures that can convey brief, prearranged orders to a submarine below communications depth. One system,
recently slated for decommissioning, relied upon extremely low-frequency
transmitters. While the details are classified, this method permitted a submarine
to operate in the lower half of its depth-speed profile and to receive (not transmit) in thirty minutes or less a trigraph, or three-character code group. This
method’s advantages were that the command center did not need to know the
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submarine’s location and could continuously transmit the signal until the boat
acknowledged. Another family of bellringer methods uses acoustic transmission. These signals, though again rudimentary, are generally not affected by the
submarine’s depth and can be received at higher speeds; however, they require
either an aircraft (usually a P-3 long-range maritime patrol aircraft) or surface
ship to transmit them, because the signaling platform must be within acoustic
range of the submarine.
It is thus possible to develop a communication architecture that would support Global Strike timing requirements by specifying a communications window for the submarine. All that would be needed to make this work is some way
to tell the crew what these windows will be. This approach is similar in concept
to alert statuses of ballistic missile submarines; however, there is no good reason
to limit the possibilities to the three stages (alert, modified alert, and nonalert)
that SSBNs utilize. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, it would be easy to incorporate a continuously variable communications readiness posture in the
overall C2 instructions given to a submarine.
Executing the tasking in the Lady Juleema scenario using current command
and control procedures would require rapid shifts of operational and tactical
control among the commanders cited above, together with frequent
redefinitions of which commanders were “supported” and which “supporting.”
At the pace at which the scene-setting scenario unfolded, that would be problematic at best. The command and control “overhead” would inevitably distract
the crew from the tactical issues (not the least of which, in the vignette, is safety
of ship in one of the world’s busiest straits). Imagine the message traffic or
e-mail between the command centers needed continually to lash together arrangements as the situation progressed—arrangements that would be ad hoc
and of no value for the next set of circumstances. It would be better to make in
advance the necessary arrangements to share operational and tactical control.
To do this I propose a concept that might be called “deconflicted and prioritized
OpCon and TaCon” (which, if adopted, submariners would likely refer to as
DAPOT, “day-poe”) and a mission matrix through which to implement it.
THE MISSION MATRIX SOLUTION
To accomplish assigned missions, an adaptive joint force will be capable
of conducting rapidly executable, globally and operationally distributed, simultaneous and sequential operations.
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS, 2003

There is a mental antacid that may be useful in trying to digest the concept of
DAPOT. First of all, in a recent informal poll of ten senior submariners, only one
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expressed any reservations, and all were confident the submarine crew would be
39
left in no doubt as to what to do. It may also help to recognize that the proposal
is not very different from concerned commands’ sending their orders to individual task units. In fact, the matrix deliberately reinforces that similarity, by giving
each combination of mission and commander a unique task unit designation.
Obviously, though, the devil in the details has his pitchfork planted squarely in
the fact that the single platform expected to fulfill these multiple tasks may find
it impossible to complete some of them due to circumstances of the moment.
This central truth entails a host of implementation issues.
Any solution to multiple operational control, then, must address several
points. The first is which mission and commander has priority in the event of a
conflict. The matrix solves this problem by specifying a priority for each combination of mission and commander; the highest-priority mission would be completed first, followed by lower-priority ones. The submarine’s commanding
officer, who may be the only person with the complete tactical picture, would
advise his masters as soon as feasible of such conflicts and of estimated execution times. To improve situational awareness, orders from any commander on
the matrix would be addressed for information to all the others, and they would
assess their tasking’s effect on the boat’s other missions.
Of course, wider theater developments known to the combatant commander
might influence mission prioritization, and it would be critical for the joint operations command center or task force commander to keep the submarine apprised of such factors. The submarine’s Battle Management Center would have
as one of its primary tasks (and would be staffed accordingly) to examine events
outside the ship’s sensor envelope to ensure that such information is factored
into planning and execution.
The second point involves the effect of the submarine’s tactical situation upon
its ability to execute a given mission. Of course, this is an issue even without shared
OpCon, but multiplicity of missions and masters compounds the problem. If a
tactical situation developed that precluded the submarine from completing any
mission in the required time, its commanding officer would have to send a message detailing the situation and the reaction times that resulted.
The third point is perhaps the most important from an implementation perspective, for it concerns who is responsible for issuing the mission matrix and
keeping it up to date. Naturally, this would be the same authority who adjudicated any disagreements among the commanders. The matrix would have to
specify the command exercising primary operational control. Depending upon
circumstances, this could be either the commander with the highest-priority
mission or the geographic commander in whose area of responsibility the SSGN
operated. Should the submarine’s commanding officer or any of the authorities

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/4

16

Sykora: SSGN
SYKORA

57

exercising operational or tactical control believe a change to the matrix necessary, they would coordinate with the primary OpCon authority, who would
work out any incompatibilities and promulgate the revised matrix.
Required reaction time is the fourth issue. A column in the matrix would indicate for each mission the maximum allowable time from the issuance of an order
until completion of the action. That entry would account for communications
delay, as well as any planning the crew must perform. Related to reaction time is
readiness posture; to address it the matrix would list for each mission both a
message-connectivity window and, optionally, a bellringer window. The submarine would have to meet the most restrictive of these.
The final point is weapon control. A matrix column would list the minimum
weapons that must be onboard to meet the commander’s requirements for a
given mission. The figure would be a composite requirement. That is, should the
weapon inventory fall below the required total, any weapons expenditure would
have to be approved by the primary OpCon authority in advance, unless a specific tasking relaxed a weapons requirement (for instance, Strategic Command
might write an execution order so as to reduce its weapon requirement by the
number of weapons the order employs, thus keeping the total weapon requirement at or below the sub’s remaining weapons after execution). The submarine
would, of course, keep all commands advised of weapons casualties or other
changes in inventory.
The table shows the resulting DAPOT instrument as it might be constructed
for the future USS Florida. Notwithstanding the groundwork that staffs would
have to perform in reaching agreement on scenarios, this is a workable approach. Happily, the only doctrinal change required would be a provision that,
in certain circumstances—such as when necessary to improve execution tempo
and so deprive the enemy of decision and reaction time—and with the approval
of the secretary of defense in advance, more than one combatant commander
might exercise operational control and more than one subordinate command
might exercise tactical control. It would be necessary to arrange and “deconflict”
such shared arrangements in advance.
OPERATIONAL EVANGELISM
Commanders will need a broad understanding of new operational
capabilities . . . in order to be capable of flexible, adaptive coordination
and direction of both forces and sensors. The staffs that support commanders must be organized and trained to take advantage of new
capabilities.
JOINT VISION 2020
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MISSION MATRIX
Primary OpCon: USCentCom
Mission

Priority

Date: 10 October 2008
Task Unit
Designation

OpCon

TaCon

Global Strike

2

StratCom

CTF 144

Oper Fires

4

CentCom

CTF 54

NSW

1

SoCom

ASUW

6

CentCom

CTF 54

USW

5

CentCom

CTF 54

Antimining

Comms
(Traffic/
Bell)
10 hours/
1 hour
12 hours/

Weapons
(Missile/
Torpedo)
50/
0
40/

6 hours

0

JOCC/

Contin./

10/

Cent

n/a

4

24 hours/

0/

1 hour

10

24 hours/

0/

1 hour

4

24 hours/

0/

6 hours

0

12 hours/

0/

4 hours

2

Readiness

6 hours
24 hours
16 hours
3 hours
12 hours

as directed

ISR

3

CentCom

CTF 54

CSAR

7

CentCom

CTF 54

as reqd
trans + 2
hours

NSW = naval special warfare; ASUW = antisurface warfare; USW = undersea warfare; ISR = intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; CSAR = combat search
and rescue; CTF = Commander Task Force

Whatever command and control arrangements it ultimately makes, the submarine force should consider training for the staffs of the commands that will
exercise operational and, if appropriate, tactical control over SSGNs. Submarine
operations are too often a mystery outside the “silent service”: “Invariably, attempts to employ submarines by commanders not familiar with their capabilities and limitations are severely limited in their effectiveness by paradigms that
fit surface and air assets.”40
There are at least two reasons to consider staff training specifically for the
SSGN. First, the mission matrix or any similar solution to the SSGN command
and control problem will surely be uncharted territory for commanders and
staffs. Second, the core staffs of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters being
stood up in Central Command will likely be dealing with cruise-missile submarines. A biannual training “road trip” through these headquarters—an exercise
in “operational evangelism”—would pay dividends in the proper employment
of this unfamiliar asset. In any case, these staffs create and maintain operational
and concept plans for their combatant commander; such training would help
ensure that they factor submarines into that planning.
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Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated
strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic
strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. . . .
From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, 20 SEPTEMBER 2001

The full potential of the SSGN cannot be fulfilled until Navy and joint leaders
decide how to solve the problem of simultaneous operational control. This is
precisely the kind of doctrinal transformation that will maximize the combat
power available to the president and regional combatant commanders, particularly in the early, high-risk stages of conflict. Even as the nation shifts from the
two-major-theater-war force structure, deployed forces ready to exercise asymmetric capabilities may be enough to deter. If deterrence fails, such hypertactical
platforms could prepare the battle space for follow-on forces. The SSGN will be,
for the foreseeable future, the nation’s only asset that can deliver significant and
immediate deep strikes without relying upon (and having to refuel) land-based
aircraft—thus the urgency of solving the multiple and simultaneous OpCon
problem.
The mission matrix, with its underlying concept as outlined here, is a possible
solution, one requiring minimal change to joint doctrine. Adopting, as much as
possible, existing command and control methods minimizes the burden of new
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Once the naval and joint staffs put some
such tool in place, operational evangelism by the submarine force can bring battle
staffs up to speed with the new procedures and the capabilities and limitations
of the SSGN itself. Completing these steps prior to the first cruise-missile submarine deployment will make its success all the more certain and conspicuous, a
new chapter in the submarine force’s long tradition of transformation.
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